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The new class of anti-inflammatory drugs, the COX-2 inhibitors, have been commercially successful to the
point of market dominance within a short time of their launch. They attract a price premium on the basis
that they are associated with fewer adverse gastric events than traditional anti-inflammatory drugs. This
marketing continues even though a pivotal safety study with one of the COX-2 inhibitors, rofecoxib,
showed a significant increase in myocardial infarction with rofecoxib use compared with a traditional anti-
inflammatory drug. This finding has led to a series of publications containing pooled analyses of existing
data that both support and refute the possibility of increased cardiovascular risk with COX-2 inhibitors.
These medical journal publications have served to obfuscate rather than provide guidance for medical
practitioners. Consideration of a research ethics committee approach to this issue suggests that it would
deal with the controversy in a straightforward manner—namely, it would simply inform research
participants of the trial results with rofecoxib. The certainty of this research ethics committee approach
raises the issue of whether it should be applied in normal medical practice outside of the research
environment. A consideration of the legal tests for disclosure of information suggests that therapeutic
medical practice should mirror that within the research environment, in this case.
T
raditional non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
(NSAIDs) decrease the pain and swelling associated
with inflammatory conditions, such as rheumatoid
arthritis; however, their chronic use increases the risk of
severe gastric side effects, including haemorrhage. The new
class of anti-inflammatory drugs known as cyclooxygenase
(COX)-2 inhibitors were developed with the aim of decreas-
ing the pain and swelling of inflammation without the
increased risk of adverse gastric events.
The first drug in this class was celecoxib, marketed by GD
Searle & Co as Celebrex. Celebrex had total sales of US$1.5
billion in 1999, its first year on the market, and it was the
most successful drug launch in US history. The second drug
in this class was rofecoxib, marketed by Merck & Co as Vioxx.
Vioxx had total sales of US$2.5 billion in 2001 and is the most
prescribed arthritis pain medication across Europe, Canada,
and Latin America.1
Although this is a successful outcome for the pharmaceu-
tical companies involved, it has been argued that there
should be caution in the prescription of new drugs because of
limited information about their effectiveness, safety, and
whether they offer an overall advantage over existing
medications.2 It has also been argued that strong marketing
of new drugs can give impetus to their prescribing when
there is doubt over their usefulness or safety.2 Rofecoxib pre-
scribing provides an example of this principle, with over one
million samples given to Canadian doctors in the year 2000.
This is more samples than any other product and is only
slightly ahead of the second ranked product, celecoxib, with
slightly fewer than one million samples provided to doctors
in the same year.3 In addition, the number of ‘‘detailing’’
visits by pharmaceutical representatives to Canadian doctors
in 2000 to promote celecoxib and rofecoxib were 77,000 and
48,000, respectively.3 Given this marketing impetus, it is
important to consider how controversies over new drugs such
as COX-2 inhibitors can be handled by prescribing doctors.
THE MEDICAL CONTROVERSY: ADVERSE
CARDIOVASCULAR EVENTS IN A VIOXX TRIAL
Merck funded a clinical trial in a large group of rheumatoid
arthritis patients with the aim of examining the gastric safety
of rofecoxib. This was the VIGOR study and initial publica-
tion of results indicated an unequivocal advantage of
rofecoxib over a traditional NSAID (naproxen) for serious
adverse gastric events.4 However, this publication mentioned
also a greater incidence of myocardial infarction in the
rofecoxib group. This result was framed in terms of a
protective effect of naproxen rather than an adverse effect
of rofecoxib.4 Although not published by Merck, availability
of the complete VIGOR data set became available on the US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) website along with the
US FDA review. This review revealed the significant increases
in serious thrombotic cardiovascular events in the rofecoxib
group versus the naproxen group.5 The effect appeared at
3 months and became especially marked by 8 months of
treatment on trial.
Such a result suggested that the cardiovascular disadvan-
tage of rofecoxib use may outweigh the gastric advantage.
There followed a series of publications with analyses of
existing data, which both supported and refuted the findings
of cardiac risk in the VIGOR study. These included in
succession:
N Mukherjee et al compared myocardial infarction rates from
already published studies with the COX-2 inhibitors,
celecoxib and rofecoxib, with the placebo group of a
published meta-analysis and concluded that use of COX-2
inhibitors was associated with increased risk of adverse
cardiovascular events.6
N then, investigators from Merck and two medical centres
reported a pooled analysis of a large number of studies
with rofecoxib. This analysis pooled data, presumably held
on file by Merck, from studies with 4 weeks’ exposure to
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approximately 2 years’ exposure and concluded there was
no increased thrombotic risk from rofecoxib use compared
with placebo or non-naproxen NSAIDs.7
N Ray et al, using data from the Tennessee Medicaid
program, reported that naproxen was not protective for
serious cardiovascular disease8 and that rofecoxib at doses
.25 mg significantly increased the risk for serious
cardiovascular disease in a group with mean rofecoxib
use of 6 weeks.9
N in a commentary article, Hochberg urged medical practi-
tioners to ‘‘be strong and resolute’’ and continue to
prescribe COX-2 inhibitors.10
Thus, the findings of cardiac risk in the VIGOR study have
been vigorously contested, using mainly statistically complex
analyses of existing data sets.
BIOLOGICAL PLAUSIBILITY FOR ADVERSE
CARDIOVASCULAR EFFECTS OF COX-2 INHIBITORS
During the statistical disputes over the findings of cardiac
risk in the VIGOR study, cellular and animal studies revealed
potential mechanisms for acceleration of occlusive vascular
disease arising from selective COX-2 inhibition. Collectively,
these studies have shown that:
N upregulation of endothelial COX-2 and consequent pro-
duction of prostacyclin, an antithrombotic prostaglandin,
may be a protective homeostatic response of blood vessels
to platelet activation11 12
N ingestion of celecoxib or rofecoxib by healthy volunteers
inhibited prostacyclin production13 14
N the intimal hyperplastic response to vascular injury in
mice is suppressed by prostacyclin—a product of vascular
COX-2 activity.15
Collectively, these studies provide potential mechanisms
whereby selective COX-2 inhibition could unbalance the
homeostatic responses of the vessel wall to injury and to
thrombus formation. Thus, there is biological plausibility for
the increased occurrence of occlusive cardiovascular events
with rofecoxib use in the VIGOR study. It is unlikely,
however, that busy medical practitioners will be exposed to
these results, which were published in the basic science
literature, and even if they were aware of the results a
practice dilemma would still emerge after attempting to
balance all of the arguments.
GUIDANCE FOR PRESCRIBING WILL NOT COME
FROM EXISTING DATA
When recent medical journal publications both support and
refute arguments for increased cardiovascular risk attached
to use of COX-2 inhibitors, confusion and indecision for
medical practitioners is understandable. The medical journal
publications have served mainly to highlight the myriad
analytical alternatives available to researchers, including
those within the pharmaceutical industry. The overall result
is to provide only obfuscation for prescribing doctors.
Thus, despite the statistically significant finding of
increased myocardial infarction in a definitive trial with
Vioxx, and despite the emergence of biological plausibility for
the adverse cardiovascular events, the sales of Vioxx have
continued unabated, with Merck’s estimate for 2003 being
US$2.6 billion.1
As outlined above, there are considerable existing data on
COX-2 inhibition, vascular homeostasis, and clinical events.
The significance and meaning of individual findings is,
however, disputed by the various stakeholders. Given this
situation, guidance for prescribing practitioners is unlikely to
come from further analysis of existing data. We suggest that
an immediate solution for practitioners is provided by
considering the problem in a different framework—namely,
the ethical/legal framework surrounding duty of care. The
impetus for this approach arises from considering how the
controversy would be handled in a research environment.
A RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROACH
If a research ethics committee (REC) were considering an
application that involved the use of rofecoxib, there is no
doubt that participants would be informed that there was an
increased incidence of myocardial infarction in a previous
trial with this drug. In the participant information sheets for
clinical drug trials, the lists of potential adverse events arising
from registered or experimental drugs are large and they
attempt to be exhaustive. In some cases, particularly those
involving cancer trials where several drugs are used in
combination, the information sheets can be 8–10 pages in
length; in part, this is because of the attempts to be
exhaustive in listing potential drug side effects. Although
we acknowledge that such lists are so voluminous that they
become uninformative, there is a perceived obligation to list
all possible adverse events. This general consideration makes the
specific point that, in the case of rofecoxib, there can be no doubt that
an increased risk of myocardial infarction would be listed in a clinical
trial information sheet as a possibility.
DUTY OF CARE IN THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE
The ethics committee approach may seem extreme with
regard to everyday medical practice, where the provision of
information by the practitioner on potential drug adverse side
effects is unlikely to be exhaustive. It is valuable, however, in
raising the question of whether there is a duty of care for
medical practitioners to inform patients given a prescription
for rofecoxib, that there was an increased rate of myocardial
infarction with its use in the VIGOR study. What should be
the test to determine this?
The scope of the duty of care in the provision of
information for treatment is not readily discerned, particu-
larly in the absence of legal training. It is clear, however, that
failure to warn of risks comes under the legal action of
negligence. In the past, the ‘‘Bolam principle’’ has been used
extensively to test this. In Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem
Royal Hospital (1985; AC 871), Lord Scarman stated:
The Bolam principle may be formulated as a rule that a
doctor is not negligent if he acts in accordance with a
practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible
body of medical opinion …16
According to this test, not informing a patient of the
VIGOR results on myocardial infarction is unlikely to be
negligent because this is probably the accepted practice of a
great many responsible medical practitioners. This is likely to
be the current situation either because doctors are unaware
of these results or because the published information on
VIGOR is contested to the point of obfuscation. Under the
Bolam test, it is probably reasonable for a medical practi-
tioner not to disclose this information.
However, the High Court of Australia set a different test in
Rogers v Whittaker (1992; 175 CLR 479). The judgment
stated:
The law should recognise that a doctor has a duty to warn
a patient of a material risk inherent in the proposed
treatment; a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the
particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s
position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach
significance to it …17
It can be assumed that most patients are likely to attach
significance to the information that rofecoxib use was
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associated with a greatly increased incidence of myocardial
infarction in a clinical trial. It is reasonable to assume that
this information would be material to their decision as to
whether they wanted to use rofecoxib as an anti-inflamma-
tory agent when other options are generally available.
Therefore, under the test imposed by the Rogers v
Whittaker judgement, a doctor would be negligent in not
disclosing this information.
A prescribing doctor would need to provide this informa-
tion in the context of other potential risks and benefits and in
dialogue with the patient to ensure that their understanding
and expectations are considered. With rofecoxib, the poten-
tial benefits may include decreased probability of serious
gastric adverse events.4 If the patient had been taking a
traditional NSAID without any serious gastric problems,
however, then there would be no apparent advantage in
changing to rofecoxib, particularly if there were no risk
factors such as age and long term daily requirements for an
anti-inflammatory agent. Along with this type of discussion
goes the difficulty in explaining to a particular patient that
the risk is based on outcomes in populations and that one
cannot predict with any certainty what will be the outcome
for that particular patient. Nevertheless it is useful to
consider that when Australian population figures from the
1990s are used, there would need to be an increase of only
0.34% to 0.68% in the annual death rate from ischaemic heart
disease to balance the deaths per annum from NSAID
induced upper gastrointestinal events.18
CONCLUSION
The general approach of an ethics committee to provision of
information can provide guidance for everyday clinical
practice. The prudent action for medical practitioners who
wish to prescribe rofecoxib is to simply inform the patient
that in the VIGOR study, rofecoxib use was associated with
an increased incidence of myocardial infarction which was
more than three times greater than that with use of
naproxen, another anti-inflammatory drug. This approach
does not require a resolution of the contested meaning of
results in the various medical journal publications on
rofecoxib.
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